Wallet Address Duplication Leads to Disaster: 178 Official Sites Compromised, Ledger Among Them
Published
On November 16th, the official websites of 178 organizations, including hardware wallet provider Ledger, BBC, Zoom, and multiple HSBC country sites, were compromised with malicious code.
MissedBlock Desk · 10 min read
Malicious Code Infiltrates Websites, Hijacking Wallet Addresses and Stealing Data
On November 16th, the official websites of 178 organizations, including hardware wallet provider Ledger, BBC, Zoom, and multiple HSBC country sites, were compromised with malicious code. The attack subtly replaced copied wallet addresses with those controlled by hackers, potentially leading visitors to unknowingly send funds to the attackers.
The Attack Vector: Exploiting a Third-Party Platform
The vulnerability did not stem from a breach of Optimizely’s Content Delivery Network (CDN) itself, but rather from a field within the platform’s backend that clients managed. Optimizely Web functions by having each client load a snippet from cdn.optimizely.com. This snippet, in addition to platform code and experiment settings, includes a custom field called Project JavaScript (projectJS), which executes on every page a user visits. Attackers injected a loader script into this field, leaving the rest of the content untouched. The malicious code was then served from Optimizely’s domain with Optimizely’s credentials, making it appear legitimate to the already-trusted source for affected websites.
Evolving Malicious Scripts and Persistent Infection
The injected loader script appeared in three variations. The most common was a plain text script tag pointing to track.js on 1688360.cc. A second variation obscured the URL using Base64 encoding within atob(), making the string “1688360.cc” undetectable through simple searches. The third variation was designed to be embedded and executed via eval if the malicious domain was blocked. In one instance, Smartsheet’s snippet was cleaned, only to be reinfected by the Base64 version, indicating the attackers retained write access during the cleanup. Some clients hosted their snippets on their own subdomains, such as opt.scheels.com or www.vodafone.com.au, but these sites were also affected as the file originated from the same compromised Optimizely project.
Track.js: The Engine of Theft
The core of the operation was track.js, a JavaScript file approximately 30 KB in size. It contained three distinct modules and an iOS-specific branch. The script targeted a wide range of cryptocurrencies, including BTC, ETH and EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, and Dogecoin. It employed checksum validation for each chain to ensure the replacement address was formatted correctly, preventing wallet applications from issuing warnings. The script only activated when text containing keywords like “wallet,” “deposit,” or “send” appeared. It modified page text, form fields, link and image attributes, copy events, navigator.clipboard, navigator.share, and the URLs and content of fetch and XHR requests. Even Function.prototype.call and apply were altered, meaning any string resembling an address would be rewritten before it could be pasted into a wallet.
Credit Card and Data Exfiltration
A second module, added at 13:43 UTC, focused on checkout forms. It validated credit card numbers using the Luhn algorithm, checked for known issuer prefixes, and verified expiration dates and CVV codes. If all three criteria were met, the card details were sent to /card.php via navigator.sendBeacon, with the card number temporarily stored in the browser’s sessionStorage to prevent duplicate submissions. A third module activated after the initial address replacement. It loaded html2canvas from the malicious domain to capture screenshots as JPEG images. These images, along with the page URL, up to 8,000 characters of document.cookie, and up to 20 original, replaced wallet addresses, were POSTed to /hit.php. The script could not access HttpOnly cookies or card numbers entered within external payment iframes from providers like Stripe or Adyen, representing the only limitations of this tool.
Mobile Exploitation and Pre-Planned Infrastructure
A separate branch of the code targeted mobile devices. When the user agent indicated an iPhone, iPad, or iPod, the script would load two boot.js files from a .icu domain. After reading the iOS version, it would load corresponding attack chains within a hidden iframe. iOS versions 13 through 17 utilized Coruna, while 18.x employed DarkSword. iOS 26 was limited to device fingerprinting. The Coruna loader’s byte patterns were identical to samples from another operation in October, and the tool’s own comments indicated that iOS 18.7.3 and 26.3 had been patched. Devices running 18.6 or earlier would attempt to reload the page every 60 seconds, with the page repeatedly flashing being the only potential sign for users. The two iOS routing domains were registered as early as November 9th, with one becoming active on November 12th, indicating that the infrastructure for this attack was established a full week prior to the main operation.
Scale of the Breach and Industry Impact
An analysis of 1,611 unique Optimizely snippets revealed that 188 snippets, affecting 178 organizations, had been injected with malicious code. Researchers preserved hashes, response headers, and capture times for each file as evidence. The actual number of affected entities is expected to be higher, as the analysis was limited to snippets discoverable at the time. The banking and financial sector was the most heavily impacted, with 32 organizations affected. Technology and SaaS followed with 23, retail and fashion with 20, video and streaming with 12, and news and media with 10. The financial sector’s impact was detailed by country: HSBC’s official websites in the United States, Hong Kong, Mexico, Singapore, Australia, UAE, Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam, Egypt, and the Philippines were all compromised. Credit reporting agency Equifax, along with its Canadian and UK websites and its subsidiary The Work Number, were also affected. ABN AMRO’s German, Dutch, and Belgian sites were similarly impacted. In the cryptocurrency and trading sector, six entities were affected, including Ledger, IG, OANDA/Coinpass, interactive investor, and TMS Brokers.
Timeline of the Attack
The attack unfolded with a clear timeline. At 04:21 UTC on November 16th, BBC’s snippet was first observed loading malicious content. The first version of track.js appeared at 08:10 UTC. It was first detected on bbc.com at 08:28 UTC. Zoom’s snippet was modified at 11:20 UTC. At 13:03 UTC, attackers began consolidating the stolen cryptocurrency into an exchange. The credit card exfiltration module was added at 13:43 UTC. A second iOS routing domain was registered at 16:38 UTC, and the final version of the payload went live at 17:56 UTC. Between 19:24 and 19:59 UTC, Report URI scanned 186 of the 1,611 affected snippets, aligning with the 186 websites and 188 files reported by Helme. A large-scale cleanup effort began between 20:41 and 21:10 UTC, with Ledger cleaned at 20:41, Smartsheet at 20:56, and BBC at 21:07. By 21:52 UTC, only TalkTalk’s snippet remained infected. The attackers rebuilt the payload 26 times on the day of the attack, with detailed analysis of the malicious files showing at least four versions within a two-hour period, and the file size growing from 28,877 bytes to 30,430 bytes.
Financial Losses and Operational Sophistication
The financial gains from the attack, though modest, are noteworthy. As of 19:25 UTC on November 16th, attacker wallets had received approximately $7,040: 0.08298 BTC (approximately $5,380, in four transactions, untouched), 17.02 LTC (approximately $762), 662.9 USDT plus 184 TRX (approximately $719), 0.055 ETH (approximately $100), and 82 USDT on BSC (approximately $82). Another on-chain reconciliation, using November 16th prices, estimated the total at around $6,600, with the discrepancy attributed to timing and the number of BTC deposits. The stolen funds were moved between 13:03 and 13:05 UTC, with USDC on Ethereum sent to a HitBTC deposit address. One of the TRON wallets had been in use since March 2026, and four of the eight wallets had never received any funds, suggesting the group was active prior to this operation. The webshell.lol injector, which targeted Turkish websites starting September 17th, has been attributed to the same actor.
Breakdown of Defenses and Attribution
The reasons for the defense failures are straightforward. The malicious files were served from trusted domains with valid certificates, and the changes did not involve the websites’ own code or servers. Most organizations’ monitoring systems focus on domain reputation and blacklists, failing to detect modifications within third-party scripts. Report URI suggested that detecting anomalous changes in third-party JavaScript and enforcing Content Security Policy (CSP) in strict mode could have blocked critical stages of the attack before its success. StepSecurity recommended blocking the hosts 1688360.cc and .icu, and advised all websites using Optimizely snippets to download their files and search for the string “1688360.” The method by which attackers gained write access to so many unrelated client projects – whether through leaked credentials, accounts with cross-client privileges, or a compromise of the Optimizely system itself – remains unclear. Both reports point to Optimizely for an explanation, and StepSecurity noted the absence of a public statement from Optimizely at the time of their report.
The Erosion of Trust and Future Implications
The true significance of this incident lies not in the $7,000 in on-chain losses, but in the deconstruction of the trust model. The blockchain industry has spent years combating phishing sites, fake apps, and fraudulent customer service. This attack, however, did not involve any forgery: the domains were legitimate, the certificates were valid, and the website code remained unaltered. The compromise was limited to a configuration setting within a third-party platform. Unlike previous incidents such as fake Microsoft website advertisements in February or the Ledger supply chain attack in October, the focus of defense has shifted from “determining if the entity is official” to “whether the content delivered by an official source has been tampered with.” Currently, very few websites are equipped to defend against this latter threat.
Direct Implications for Taiwanese Readers
For readers in Taiwan, the list of affected entities holds direct relevance. When high-traffic official websites like hsbc.com.tw load compromised third-party scripts, the impact extends beyond cryptocurrency investors to anyone who enters data on those pages. Financial institutions and large e-commerce platforms commonly use A/B testing, marketing automation, and customer service plugins, all of which gain full page execution rights in exchange for a single script tag. Two key questions arise in the aftermath of this event: First, will Optimizely disclose the path through which access was breached and the list of affected projects? Second, will the compromised credit card numbers and cookies surface elsewhere in the coming weeks? While on-chain data only reveals $7,000, the off-chain losses remain unknown.
Actionable Advice for Users
The actionable conclusions are concrete. After copying a wallet address, users should verify it against the address displayed on their wallet application or hardware wallet screen, not just the copied content. For large transfers, initiate a small test transaction first to confirm the recipient has received the funds before sending the full amount. The most challenging aspect of address replacement is that attackers provide a perfectly valid, checksum-correct address, meaning no error will appear before the transaction is sent. The only safeguard is to consciously look at the device screen.
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